The fall of Kabul epitomises the failure of 20 years of US military strategy
After almost two decades of conflict and bloodshed, Sunday the 15th of August saw a dramatic and shocking conclusion to the United States longest and most costly war in its history. Having entered Afghanistan in October of 2001 following the 9/11 attacks, the world awakens to Taliban rule once again following the fall of Kabul. Needless to say, the events that have unfolded will be looked back upon as a deeply catastrophic military and political failure, one that will stain the United States reputation in foreign policy for decades to come. With some comparing this moment to Saigon (the desperate and disastrous withdrawal of US personnel from South Vietnam in 1975 as communist forces closed into the capital) many may begin to question why the greatest power in geopolitics with the most sophisticated military, has allowed such disastrous events to occur.
There is little doubt now that the intelligence community and military were doubtful of the ability of the Afghan government to resist Taliban advancements. However, it did come as a surprise the rapid pace the Taliban were able to advance, capturing many cities and within days seizing Kabul itself just hours after President Ashraf Ghani fled the presidential palace.
The war in Afghanistan has long been unpopular amongst both the political class and the American electorate. Having spent just over $1 trillion funding the war, costing the lives of just under 3000 US servicemen and thousands of countless other NATO forces as well as agency operatives; it was no wonder that 77% of Americans supported the withdrawal in a survey conducted earlier this year. President Biden had finally fulfilled the commitment made by three successive US administrations, escalated under the Trump administration, which saw face to face negotiations between the Taliban and Secretary of State Mike Pompeu and the eventual agreement signed in Doha.
Although the lack of popularity of the war contributed to the eventual decision to withdraw US and NATO presence in the country, it most certainly is not the only contributing factor, rather far from it. With growing challenges coming from China, threatening US economic and political dominance across the world, issues in the Middle East have taken a backseat on the priority list for US foreign policy. The Biden administration clearly sees the Middle East as less important to their geopolitical agenda, rather wishing to pivot much of their focus on China and the threat they pose. Indeed President Biden has already shown his lack of interest in the region’s politics, pulling back support for the Saudi led coalition offensive in Yemen as well as avoiding substantial intervention during the 11-day Israeli-Palestinian conflict earlier in the year. Consequently, it has become a focus of necessity to relinquish resources from regional operations, including military presence in Afghanistan. The lack of care for Afghan politics after the US withdrawal emphasizes the little thought given to the humanitarian cost endured by the Afghan people. But seen as Afghanistan will once again be ruled by the Taliban regime, the same group that harboured the terrorists of 9/11, some will beg to question whether the purpose of invasion has been achieved. Having plunged Afghanistan into a pit of instability, it is a moral strategic disaster to withdraw the security and support mechanisms which supported and stabilised the state, leaving them exposed to Taliban momentum, allowing for the nation to quickly fall into the hands of the regime. Afghanistan now sees much of its progressive progress, including women’s education, under severe threat, leaving the future of millions deeply uncertain.
Whilst US Secretary of State Antony Blinken argued that remaining in Afghanistan for “five years or even one year” would only come in favour of Americas “strategic competitors” and would “not be in the national interest”, I would strongly argue that this method of withdrawal does more harm to US interests than had the United States continued its military presence in the country. Not only could Afghanistan once again become a breeding ground for terrorist activity, but it will also display to the world America’s lack of commitment to its allies in times of dire need.
Why wouldn’t China now be willing to challenge Taiwan’s independence, a country that heavily relies on the US for defence support? Could Iran have a boost in confidence to step up presence in the Middle East, especially in Yemen and Syria not fearing backlash from the United States? What would that mean for Saudi Arabia and many of the gulf states who may become more sceptical of America’s commitment to their security and defence funding? Will Pakistan and central Asian nations seek the further strengthening of ties with Russia for defence and security support, especially in light of the resurgence of the Taliban. All those consequences will indeed “not be in the national interest” of the United States or its western allies, curtailing their diplomatic and military dominance around the world. So it begs the question, how badly have President Biden and successive administrations miscalculated the drawbacks and how detrimental will the political and geopolitical damage be?
